Abstract: I understand the claim that there is a right to work as the claim that involuntary unemployment is an injustice that requires of justice enforcement institutions to stop it. I argue that in present conditions of high productivity it is more consistent with the liberal tradition to proclaim a right to develop one's capabilities than a right to work. The steps of my argument are: (1) 
A Plea to Replace the Right to Work with a More
Original Right Let me preface my investigation with some introductory remarks. The rst thing to state in a discussion of the right to work is how curious a conception it is.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims: Everyone has the right to work. But as it makes clear by the explanation that follows these words, the right to work it proclaims is a right to nd an adequate job: Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
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So the right to work would better be called a right to employment or, as the activities of the employed are better called labor than work, a right to labor. As to the concept of a right, I presuppose that the recognition of someone's right to p is the ascription of a duty of justice enforcement institutions to secure p for 1 Article 23.1. As Article 1(2) of the German Grundgesetz appeals to the human rights as the basis of German legislation (Das Deutsche Volk bekennt sich [...] 
zu unverletzlichen und unveräuÿerlichen Menschenrechten als Grundlage jeder menschlichen Gemeinschaft, des
Friedens und der Gerechtigkeit in der Welt) the right to work proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be presumed valid in Germany. 2 Hence, to proclaim my right to labor implies the duty of justice to secure labor for me. But labor is nothing we like to do if it was not for the money earned by labor, and it is odd to demand to secure someone a disliked activity.
Rather than protecting us against the evil of unemployment by a right to labor, we should protect us against the social causes that make unemployment an evil by a right to a life without the coercion of employment if productivity allows for this. True, it is reasonable to proclaim a right to labor if it is injustice to be without employment and we cannot change the social conditions that make unemployment unjust. But we can change them, as I'll try to show. Now, it is not an accident that what in fact is only a right to employment or labor has been given the more sonorous title of a right to work. By using this title appeal is made to ideas of a specic nobility of work. Such an appeal is also made in hypocritical phrases like the German Arbeit adelt,`work ennobles the soul', and most atrociously in the words put over the gate of Auschwitz that greeted its victims, Arbeit macht frei,`work liberates'. Yet, as hypocrisy is a tribute paid to virtue, such uses are possible only because there is a rational core in the idea that work, unlike labor or employment, has a quality that justies the claim everyone has a right to it. The rational core are these ideas: only by the work of adapting nature, understood as the preconditions of human existence, to human capabilities can human beings become what they are; such work can be performed only in cooperation; exclusion from this cooperative work is injustice.
These ideas are inseparable from both socialism and liberalism.
Therefore, the right to live without the coercion of employment that should replace the right to work must be conceived in a way that cooperation in adapting nature to human capabilities is furthered rather than hindered. To conceive it thus we must look closer at the rational core of the ideas of the nobility of work.
This core has been developed in what I call the Promethean venture, an idea that inspired poets and philosophers though today it is discredited. But we can neither understand why the right to work has been proclaimed nor what we should replace this right with unless we take account of it.
The Argument of Interaction
A right to work which in fact is a right to employment can be plausibly assumed only if unemployment is not only unpleasant (because of the lack of money it entails) but also unjust. How can we assume that it is? Suppose the unemployed get an unemployment compensation that is less than their salary but sucient for a decent life. Would this imply that unemployment is just? My thesis is that even a decent dole does not make involuntary unemployment just. I see two reasons for its injustice. I'll concentrate on what I think is the more interesting one and call it the argument of interaction.
2 I follow the tradition of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. Hohfeld dened the paradigm of rights, claim rights, by the concept of duty (A has a claim right against B that B p i B has a duty against A that B p) and presumed the existence of justice enforcement institutions. Cp. Hohfeld 1946.
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It is an argument inspired by an idea that harks back to Marx and Descartes and more ancient thinkers.
3 It looks a little obsolete. It assumes, rst, a nonnormative way to look at society. This way consists of relating what happens in society to its interaction with its natural and cultural environment, with all the conditions a society nds as something given that form society but to which it can react, thus changing them and being again changed by its reaction to them. I'll subsume these preconditions under the concept of nature although they include history. It is an interaction performed in many spheres, in politics, science, arts and other kinds of activities, but in a particularly momentous way in economy, the activities by which a society produces what it consumes. All of them have started from conditions people did not choose and had to adapt to and aim at a state that leave human capabilities as much opportunity to ourish as possible. Second, the argument assumes a normative principle, namely, that everyone has a right to participate in this interaction, either equally or according to their talents; we need not decide in which way. Its consequence for the question of whether unemployment is unjust is obvious. As the unemployed are excluded from this interaction as far as it occurs in economy, unemployment is unjust.
Before considering objections to the interaction argument, consider its two parts. Its non-normative assumption is the idea that any society interacts with its given environment. Taken for itself, this assumption puts our view of society in a certain light, but it can hardly be denied. We may even say it is trivial and in any case incapable of showing that involuntary unemployment is unjust even though the unemployed get a decent dole. This follows only if we accept the obviously non-trivial normative idea that presupposes the rather trivial descriptive idea of an interaction. This is the idea that the interaction is a process all members of society have a right to participate in or to codetermine. What is this normative idea based on?
The Promethean and the Liberal Normative Premises of the Interaction Argument
It is based on two parts, the Promethean idea and the liberal proviso.
The Promethean idea is that the interaction is a process that people should determine rather than be determined by. This idea has been articulated, though not suciently, in Descartes' idea that people should become quasi masters and possessors of nature and Marx's idea of labor as the metabolism between mankind and nature. It assumes that mankind can and ought to become an agent that stops being the result of conditions it has been created by and starts transforming its dependency into a relation in which it increasingly determi- The liberal proviso is that whatever is done in the name of mankind must be done in a way every human being can participate in. It requires of the Promethean venture, as it claims to act in the name of mankind, that everyone is codetermining it. In fact, people who are not participating in the process will be determined by those determining the process. Hence, the Promethean venture can be realized only if it conforms to the liberal proviso.
Let us delay considering whether we can agree with the Promethean idea and ask for the reason of the liberal proviso. It is an equality condition that is inseparable from the central idea of liberalism, that of rights. The liberal idea of rights has been most eciently formulated by Locke and Kant. It says every rational being has an equal claim on deciding on their own life or, negatively expressed, no such being has a privilege in deciding on other people.
4 It is rooted in two premises:`abilities imply entitlements' and`equal abilities imply equal entitlements'. Hence, if creatures have the ability of deciding on their life in a way that takes account of the same ability and similar interests of creatures with the same ability, they are entitled to use their ability; hence, have a right to decide on their life. And if they do not dier in this ability, they have an equal right to do so; hence, the basic right of liberty is conditioned on an equality that secures the same right to everyone gifted with the same ability.
Why Liberalism Commits to the Promethean Idea
If we assume that the interaction between society and its preconditions affects everyone's life but leave the transformation of the interaction into a mandetermined process (the Promethean venture) to some people only, we concede to them a privilege that for the reasons explained is incompatible with the liberal idea of rights. But there is an additional reason for rejecting this privilege. It even shows that the liberal idea of rights implies the Promethean idea.
Most liberals did not only assume a right to individual self-determination but also a duty to it, or at least recommended that individuals should master their life rather than being determined by the accidental conditions of their birth. This 4 Locke denes rights (without using the term) when he denes the state of nature by the two properties of freedom and equality, justifying the latter by arguing that nothing
[is] more evident, than that Creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one 
The Anti-Economist Argument
Let's come back to the question of whether unemployment is unjust even if the dole is decent. If we accept both the liberal idea of rights implying the equality condition and our dependence on the interaction of society with its preconditions, and if we accept that economy is part of this interaction process and unemployment excludes from this part of the process, then the conclusion is that involuntary unemployment is unjust even if compensated with a decent dole. I presume we accept the liberal idea of rights and our dependence on the interaction. We certainly have also to accept that economy is part of the interaction, understood as people's dependency on the preconditions of society.
But is it also part of the interaction when the interaction is transformed into the Promethean venture?
If exclusion from economy means exclusion from the Promethean venture, the employed, in contrast to the unemployed, should codetermine the Promethean venture. At this expectation we may laugh. For it seems that as little as the unemployed, the mass of the employed take part in that venture. Even the leaders of economy whose decisions have an eect on the interaction do not really determine it, as we may argue. Rather, they are determined by the constraints of an economic system they are incapable of controlling because it depends on markets. In economy there just is no determination of society's interaction with nature, neither by the masses nor by the economic leaders. The unemployed are 5 This fact has been given most prominence to by Durkheim and, of course, Marx.
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Ulrich Steinvorth not excluded from the Promethean venture because economy is excluded from this venture.
An argument of this kind has probably convinced Marx and other thinkers that mankind can never overcome its dependency on nature as long as it does not replace market economy with a production that responds directly to the commands of an institution that represents the will of mankind, and such a form of production would be politics or administration rather than economy. Let's call this the anti-economist argument. It is powerful and momentous, but only as long as we overlook that it depends on a conception of the Promethean venture that may seem natural but is not. Most often, the Promethean venture has been conceived the way it is presupposed in the anti-economist argument. It is because the acceptance of this argument proved disastrous that the Promethean ideas have fallen in discredit. Economic activities can serve as an example to illustrate both this autonomous conception and the prevailing centralist one. According to the centralist conception, economic activities can belong to the Promethean venture only if market production is replaced by a form that produces not for the unpredictable demands of the markets but for the recognized demands of the consumers. The demands are recognized in a decision procedure of the revolutionary institutionparty, state or religionthat claims to represent the will of Promethean mankind. Market production necessarily is an arrogation of decisions that belong not to the agents of economy but to the representatives of mankind.
Markets can never express the will of mankind as they are incompatible with a decision procedure of one institution.
According to the autonomous conception of the Promethean venture, economic activities, whether they use markets or not, become Promethean when the economic agents produce and exchange in a way they think perfect for achieving the specic aim of economic activities, which is the production of wealth or the perfect satisfaction of consumption interests. The autonomous conception presupposes that activities are distinguished by dierent aims that require dierent perfection standards. Their standards cannot be deduced from some abstract moral principles but must be learned by doing. Therefore, the agents of economy cannot delegate their decision and responsibility to any representatives of mankind. Rather, they themselves represent mankind in its eort to transform dependence in economy into mastery.
The same applies to other spheres of activities, for which the centralist conception of the Promethean venture has never been convincing. The scientist, the artist or the religious cannot delegate their decisions on what is right or wrong in their spheres to any representative of mankind. It is obviously up to them to decide which standards of right and wrong they should use. Had the adherents of the Promethean idea thought of science, arts, religion, the family and other spheres in which mankind is dependent and can become quasi master, the centralist conception would have seemed too weird to them. They succeeded to disregard them by considering them dependent on economy and presupposing that economy can be mastered only by politics or administration. But dependency in the spheres outside politics and economy has its specic causes, just as mastery in them has its autonomous standards irreducible to those of economy or politics.
Is the Autonomous Venture Still Promethean?
True, the autonomous conception forces us to think of the Promethean venture in a way that may seem too new as to allow calling it Promethean. First, the idea of mankind's becoming master or quasi master of nature turns into the idea of detecting and applying the specic perfection standards. But rather than abolishing the Promethean idea, this change claries it. Becoming master of nature is no clear idea at all while detecting and applying perfection standards is, provided we look at spheres such as science or economy where we nd unambiguous perfection standards. Moreover, replacing contingent moral standards by adequate perfection standards of value-spheres is an emancipation from history and nature that conforms precisely to the idea of a Promethean venture.
Second, the centralist conception presents the Promethean venture as one process fought by one subject, mankind, condensed into the avant-garde of a revolutionary party or religious community.
7 The autonomous conception presents it as a process fought in the many spheres of activities that dier by their dierent perfection standards. It is split into as many processes as there are value spheres in the autonomous conception; hence, the idea that they belong together can be lost and with it the very idea of a Promethean venture. But it can be regained as soon as we remember that they all transform dependence on accidental moral standards into criteria that do justice to the kinds of activity we can perform. They all belong to a process of emancipation in which success or failure in one part aects any other part.
Moreover, the centralist conception fails the liberal participation condition, the autonomous conception does not. The centralist conception, though it appeals to everyone to join the ght of the avant-garde for progress, has in fact no place for everyone's participation; average people are downgraded to applaud the avant-garde. In contrast, though the autonomous conception allows for spherespecic avant-gardes, they are dependent not on the applause but the judgment of the average members of a sphere. Even the leading scientists are dependent on standards developed not by them but the community of science and their application by any member of the community. what is good for production and mankind, provided markets are regulated by principles that exclude or minimize harmful products and production.
A Non-Promethean Reason Why Involuntary

Unemployment Is Unjust
Let's again return to our starting question, whether unemployment is unjust even if compensated by a decent dole. Our discussion of the Promethean idea was to decide whether the sphere of economy that the unemployed are excluded from is part of the Promethean venture at all. The result is that it is as we must conceive of this process in the autonomous and not the centralist way. So if we accept the Promethean idea, as I said I presume we do in order to be consistent liberals, then we have to conclude that involuntary unemployment is injustice, even if it is compensated with a decent dole.
But there is another reason why involuntary unemployment is unjust. According to most theorists, the natural resources that are allocated in any economy are neither private property nor common property of a kind that would be free for use by those who come rst. Rather, they are a commons that must be used in the interest of all mankind. The dole would secure me the choice if it were converted into a basic income that is unconditionally paid to everyone and allows everyone the choice between a frugal life without employment and an employment that oers more money. The rst objection is that basic income would make labor in the economic sphere so unattractive that too few people would remain in it. True, if even the lowest basic income that just ensures a decent life would leave too few people in economy, we can forget about it. But this is implausible, as the problems of unemployment arise just because the economy produces more than the consumers can buy with the money they have. Experts agree neither on how much can be paid as a basic income nor on the best way to introduce it. But even conservative politicians and established economists agree that a basic income that ensures a decent life and does not reduce production is possible.
11 So we shouldn't be too skeptical of the argument that it is possible to balance out how low basic income and how high net salaries in business should be for having the desired eect of a ourishing economy.
Another objection is that it is unjust to tax the busy to nance the lazy. The answer is that technology has made the moral predications of industriousness and laziness obsolete. The industrious are today the people who arrogate the natural resources. They exclude the rest of mankind from common property.
Natural resources have not been produced by those who exploit them; they are not their private property. So it is not unjust to tax the industrious. True, it would be both unjust and stupid to tax them so severely that they would stop producing. The wealth they produce is only to a part the result of their use of common property. Another part is their due. They have a right to be rewarded for their social function to make the economically most productive use of social resources and to be rewarded in proportion to the degree of their productivity.
But society has also a right to siphon o from their product the value that is due to the resources that are common property.
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A third objection is that basic income will not make people active in the noneconomic value spheres but rather restrict their lives to ghting for increases of basic income. This danger 13 can perhaps be reduced if activities in other spheres are rewarded by their sphere-specic forms of gratication and individuals learn to value such gratications. For the artist and scientist, reward by money is less important than the recognition by those they esteem.
11 Cp., among many others, Straubhaar 2006. 12 The amount of this value cannot be measured by xing the value of natural resources; for natural resources do no longer exist in their original form when no labor had been added to them . Steiner 1981; 1992 and 1994, 271, proposes that the over-appropriators of natural resources, in proportion to their over-appropriation, compensate the under-appropriators. I think it is just impossible to evaluate in any currency over-and under-appropriation. Cp. Steinvorth 1999, 123138, and Steinvorth 2009b . The value of the common resources can only be measured by the costs necessary for sustaining natural resources, including a healthy environment. Moreover, as far as people are excluded from using cultural resources by their lack of education, the costs of making this part of the common resources accessible to everyone by education also has to be nanced by taxing those who are advantaged by their education.
13 This is the reason I criticised basic income in Steinvorth 1999, 161.. without the only activity left to them. Surely, nothing could be worse. (Arendt 1958, 5) Nothing could be better under conditions that we might call normal than that people become superuous in economy and labor becomes scarce; labor is unpleasant. Yet according to Arendt, labor has become the only activity left to most people that gives them meaning, although it is an activity that`normally' is only a necessary means for activities that have a meaning. The Greeks still knew that meaning is given to life by what Arendt calls action and work. Today, the horizon of experience has shrunk and it is only the activities of preserving life that we share with animals in which most people can nd meaning. Therefore, nothing could be worse than the society we are living in, a society that runs short of labor. In such a society, basic income will not be the door to spheres of activity such as science and arts. Activities that do not serve life but have a life-independent meaning and make life worth living in the rst place are not understood by most people. Hence, introducing basic income will only lead to ghting for its increase.
Perhaps Arendt is right. If she was, we would have little reason to think of abolishing the conditions that make unemployment unpleasant and unjust, let alone of the Promethean venture. The best we can make of her thesis is to insist on the life-independent value of activities in non-economic spheres, such as that of science and arts. But a necessary condition for developing an understanding for such activities is that people are no longer coerced to nd a job to earn their money. Basic income would rid them of this coercion. It is certainly not sucient for the redetection of the meaning of activities that are not labor, but it is necessary. Whether Arendt is right or not, she conrms that it is paradoxical to proclaim a right to labor. But she also conrms that unemployment in modern society is injustice, as it excludes the unemployed from the only activity that is generally understood to be meaningful. Thus she conrms that unemployment cannot be made just by even a decent dole if it does not open, rst, the understanding for the meaning of activities outside labor and employment and second, the participation in such activities. 14 14 I have been more explicit on this and some other points only touched in this paper in There are risks in introducing basic income, but there are still more risks in not introducing it. It seems not too implausible that the coercion of labor can be got rid of without loss of wealth. If this is true there is little sense in proclaiming a right to work that is a right to employment. The proclamation of a right to work presupposes that it is unjust not to have an employment. Considering the resources of modern societies, it is dicult not to agree with this presupposition.
But if (1) it is unjust not to have an employment, (2) the labor of employment is unpleasant for most people, (3) it is possible to do without unpleasant labor by introducing an institution such as basic income and (4) participation in the Promethean venture is possible without the coercion of labor, then it would be irrational not to introduce such an institution. Hence, rather than proclaiming a right to work we should proclaim a right to live without the coercion of labor but with the opportunity of participating in one or more of the branches of the Promethean venture. Participation in it is necessary because it is required by the liberal principle of equality.
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